Citations philosophiques expliquées : 100 citations pour by Florence Perrin, Alexis Rosenbaum

By Florence Perrin, Alexis Rosenbaum

Pédagogique, clair et vivant, ce livre constitue une creation actuelle aux grands auteurs de l. a. philosophie. Organisé par thèmes de réflexion, il suggest une sélection de a hundred citations expliquées. Pour chacune, on trouve : une mise en contexte dans l'oeuvre et l'époque du philosophe ; une explication du problème posé ; des exemples de l. a. vie quotidienne ; une quotation complémentaire. Des pistes de lecture viennent éclairer chaque thématique.

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The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)

James Warren (ed. ), The Cambridge better half to Epicureanism, Cambridge UP, 2009, 342pp. , $29. ninety nine (pbk), ISBN 9780521695305.

Reviewed through Jeffrey S. Purinton, collage of Oklahoma

Like previous books within the sequence, The Cambridge spouse to Epicurus starts with an creation by means of the editor through a couple of chapters -- fifteen within the current case -- every one by means of a distinct professional pupil. I shall talk about them in order.

(1) Diskin Clay's "The Athenian Garden" is a very good precis of what we all know approximately Epicurus and the Epicurean groups in Athens and in other places in the course of Epicurus' lifetime. Clay explains Epicurus' method of writing, protecting Epicurus opposed to the cost that his polemical derision of alternative philosophers represents "a nadir of philosophical discourse" and evaluating Epicurus' letters to the epistles of St. Paul. Clay speculates that Epicurus wrote "late in his career" his 3 surviving letters and the gathering of 40 doctrinal pronouncements referred to as the Kyriai Doxai whilst he "realized that for his inspiration to outlive him he must lessen it to a understandable and noteworthy shape. " the opposite "means Epicurus devised for perpetuating the community" used to be the perpetuation of "the 5 cults he had based within the backyard. " Clay defends Epicurus opposed to the cost that those hero cults "seem to contradict primary doctrines of Epicurean philosophy" (no afterlife and no excitement in dying) by way of noting that the cults have been for the convenience, now not of the heroic useless, yet of the residing worshippers.

(2) David Sedley's, "Epicureanism within the Roman Republic," is additionally stable. because of the "shift of the centre of gravity clear of Athens," writes Sedley, Epicureanism, just like the different colleges, underwent "decentralization," with Epicurean facilities bobbing up in Syria and Rhodes and engaging in debates with out paying shut consciousness to the present Epicurean scholarch in Athens. Sedley then turns to Philodemus, explaining the overlook of Epicurean perspectives on physics and arithmetic in Philodemus' writings when it comes to the pursuits of Philodemus' Roman viewers. a few of Philodemus' writings, observes Sedley, have been intended for common stream, e. g. , his non-partisan histories of the Academy and the Stoa, whereas others, according to notes taken from the lectures of his instructor Zeno of Sidon, weren't. finest is Sedley's dialogue of the focal point in Philodemus' day on "the learn of foundational texts," i. e. , the writings of Epicurus and his 3 best students. Philodemus' instructor Zeno practised "athetization of allegedly inauthentic works" attributed to those 4 "great men," whereas Demetrius of Laconia practised "emendation of the canonical texts, occasionally in keeping with the collation of manuscripts and selection among competing readings. " subsequent Sedley discusses the "native Italian Epicurean circulate . . . carried out in Latin. " Then he turns to Lucretius, arguing that, "although Lucretius' profile resembles" that of the local Italian move, "his emphasis at the novelty of his job in Latinizing Epicureanism . . . is a disadvantage to seeing him as half of" that culture. it really is "safer," says Sedley, "to view him as working outdoors proven philosophical circles" and "working without delay from Epicurus' On Nature," other than in his proems and moral diatribes. Lucretius' poem offers no indication of any political allegiance, yet different Epicureans did get politically concerned: Torquatus, Caesar's murderer Cassius, and a few who sided with Caesar. This political involvement used to be justified, despite Epicurus' injunction to stick out of politics, by way of "invoking a clause stated to have allowed the prohibition to be put aside in a time of emergency. " "The leader importance of Epicurean political engagement in the course of the past due Republic," Sedley provides, lies "in the measure of sheer civic respectability that Epicureanism had acquired" one of the Roman elite.

(3) Michael Erler's "Epicureanism within the Roman Empire" completes the cast historic survey supplied by way of the 1st 3 chapters. Erler covers an outstanding many authors: the Stoic Seneca, who "appropriates Epicurean ideas" and stocks the Epicurean "therapeutic version for facing life"; Plutarch, who's "much much less open-minded and confident approximately Epicurus' teachings" and employs "the arsenal of conventional polemics" opposed to them, yet who still occasionally borrows from Epicureanism; Diogenianus, who "argues from an Epicurean position" opposed to destiny and prophecy; Lucian, whose treatise Alexander or the fake prophet "seeks to place up a monument to Epicurus the 'saviour'"; Diogenes of Oenoanda, whose inscribed stoa used to be actually one of these monument; Plotinus, who sees Epicureans as "heavy birds . . . incapable of flying high," yet who still uses a few Epicurean principles; and different Neo-Platonists. Erler concludes with the Christians, who, even with their noticeable disagreements with Epicureans, shared their aversion to pagan superstitition and their supply of another way of life and promise of salvation. Erler notes that Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian occasionally borrow Epicurean rules, and that Augustine conceded, "I might have needed to hand the palm to Epicurus . . . yet for my very own trust in . . . everlasting existence. "

(4) Pierre-Marie Morel's "Epicurean atomism," translated from the French by means of James Warren, is the weakest bankruptcy of the booklet. It says helpful little, and says it confusingly. It starts via determining the "Atomist thesis," that every one our bodies are both composites or the atoms from which composites are made, then speaks of this thesis as an "argument. " A thesis is an issue? "The moment thesis," says Morel, "is that the 1st thesis issues not just a unmarried point . . . of physics, yet its crucial middle on which all others depend". the second one thesis is that the 1st thesis applies generally?

The first formula of the Atomist Thesis may possibly wrongly recommend that Epicurean physics is only atomist within the feel that the Atomist Thesis and its corollaries might suffice to build the whole thing of traditional philosophy. to the contrary, it seems that in keeping with Epicurean epistemology the statement of the realm, empirical acquaintance, isn't only valid yet, fairly, necessary.

To whom might Epicurus' being an atomist recommend that he used to be now not an empiricist? additional examples of such complicated pronouncements can be given.

Morel continues that Epicurus attributed minimum components to atoms to respond to Aristotle's feedback that Democritus' partless atoms couldn't flow, given that no physique can move as a complete a spatial restrict. I argued by contrast in "Magnifying Epicurean Minima," old Philosophy 14 (1994). Nor do I settle for a moment motivation for positing minima attributed by way of Morel to Epicurus: "the difficulty to think about the differences of atomic sizes as basic multiples of the smallest atomic dimension. " Morel closes his part on minima with a number of problems that stay with Epicurus' thought of minima as he is aware it: are they in touch? Are they 3-dimensional? if that is so, how are they no longer divisible in idea? I solution those questions within the aforementioned article.

Morel makes a tremendous deal of Lucretius' descriptions of atoms as "the seeds of things," "the turbines of things," and "generative topic. " "By nature," Morel writes, "the atoms are either bodily autonomous and in addition apt to shape our bodies. therefore the houses of atoms presuppose the life of composites. " i'm really not convinced what that final sentence capability. Morel is worried to teach "that atoms will not be basically the materials but in addition the generative ideas of composites," that's precise adequate. yet he doesn't provide a lot of an evidence of the way they are often. He easily cites Epicurus' point out of "the atoms . . . out of which (ex hōn) an international could come up, or through which (huph' hōn) an international may be formed," then insists that "the atoms . . . aren't merely the parts ('those out of which') but additionally real spontaneous brokers or fast motor ideas ('by which') of the formation of a world," then provides that the atoms need to be "appropriate seeds. " wouldn't it were extra informative to notice that a few atoms have hooks?

(5) Elizabeth Asmis' "Epicurean empiricism" discusses Epicurus' "two uncomplicated ideas of research: a requirement for preliminary suggestions as a method of formulating difficulties; and a requirement for perceptions and emotions as a way of inferring what's no longer saw. " An "initial concept" is named a "preconception" (prolēpsis) by way of Epicurus. Asmis argues that "all preconceptions, even the main complicated (e. g. , the concept that 'god'), are a checklist of appearances from open air, freed from any additional component of interpretation. " "There is an act of inference," she offers, within the formation of such recommendations, "but it comprises easily spotting connections which are given in experience," i. e. , of "attending to the variations and similarities one of the appearances. " it is a shrewdpermanent try to reconcile the facts that preconceptions are mere "memories" with the proof "that a few preconceptions not less than contain a few rational research of the appearances," e. g. , the preconception 'god. ' My purely objection is that she doesn't settle for my analyzing of the word "similarity and transition" (similitudine et transitione) in Cicero, ND 1. forty nine, examining it as an alternative by way of what Philodemus calls "transition through similarity" (kath' homoiotēta metabasis). For my refutation, see pp. 206-9 of my "Epicurus at the Nature of the Gods," Oxford reviews in old Philosophy 21 (2001) 181-231.

Next, Asmis turns to Epicurus' moment rule of research: one needs to use "perceptions" (aisthēseis) and "feelings" (pathē) as indicators of what's "waiting" to be saw (to prosmenon) and what can't be saw ("the non-apparent", to adēlon). "Feelings" are symptoms of internal stipulations of delight and ache, "perceptions" of what's outdoors us (e. g. , colors). And all perceptions are real. For this thesis, Epicurus

offered uncomplicated arguments. the 1st is that until one accepts all of the perceptions, stripped of any further opinion, as a foundation of judgement, there isn't any method of settling, or certainly undertaking, any enquiry. the second one is that no matter what appears to be like in conception corresponds to anything that enters us from outdoor; in each case, for that reason, we understand whatever from outdoor because it relatively is.

Perception of this sense-object is often real, while additional opinion will be real or false.

So a long way, so sturdy. yet now think about this:

Epicurus held that reviews of this type 'become' actual if there's 'witnessing' (epimarturēsis) and fake if there's 'no witnessing' (ouk epimarturēsis). nevertheless, critiques approximately what's no longer obvious 'become' real if there's 'no counterwitnessing' (ouk antimarturēsis) and fake if there's 'counterwitnessing' (antimarturēsis). The time period 'become' exhibits that the opinion is first and foremost neither actual nor fake; it turns into real or fake because the results of a style of testing.

This is to make a mountain out of the molehill verb "become" (ginetai), that may as simply be translated 'turns out to be (true or false). '

Asmis is going directly to say,

an opinion approximately what's 'waiting' [to be saw] turns into real at any time when the function that has been further through opinion turns into obvious, even if this option exists objectively. by contrast view, one might item that this can be to show the thought of 'true opinion' on its head, for the reality of an opinion should be solely relative to the observer.

She replies: "any opinion approximately what's 'waiting' is an expectation approximately what's going to look, no longer an opinion approximately what exists objectively. " So, e. g. , the opinion that's proven isn't really 'That's Plato over there' yet only 'When i am getting a better view, i'll have a notion that's just like the perceptions that i've got had whilst taking a look at Plato within the past,' an opinion that's proven whether one is asking, no longer at Plato, yet at Plato's evil twin.

(6) Liba Taub's "Cosmology and meteorology" emphasizes that "Epicurean cosmology and meteorology have been stimulated through the need to relieve worry of gods. " "In order to relieve anxiety," she notes, "it is enough to have the capacity to supply a few attainable motives for" meteorological phenomena. And "sufficient realizing of cosmology and meteorology can be found to boring humans to relieve their anxieties, easily utilizing universal daily innovations related to utilizing transparent language, observations, and analogies to what's already conventional. " Her dialogue of cosmology covers the infinity of the universe, the thesis that there's "an absolute, and typical, 'up' and 'down' within the universe," the thesis that our cosmos is only one of an infinitely many, the steadiness of the earth, and "the lifestyles cycle of our kosmos. " Her dialogue of meteorology emphasizes Epicurus' "hallmark strategies of drawing analogies to daily event and suggesting a couple of attainable causes" for a number of the meteorological phenomena. "Curiously," she observes, "Epicurus' remedy of ice is markedly different," for the following he "refers to atomic idea and makes use of geometrical language ('circular', 'scalene', 'acute-angled') to explain the prospective shapes of ice atoms. " This "use of technical phrases . . . contrasts with the language of daily adventure used to explain so much different phenomena. "

(7) Christopher Gill's "Psychology" discusses "(1) the physically nature of the psyche, (2) the atomic composition of the psyche, and (3) hyperlinks among mental features and the constitution of the body," concluding with "(4) the capability of the psyche, in humans, for the improvement of service provider and accountability. " "The psyche is bodily," he explains,

its designated makeup being defined by way of partial resemblance to different high-quality and cellular different types of physique (wind and heat). therefore, Epicurus replaces the conventional . . . distinction among psyche and physique with that among the psyche (one a part of the physique) and the remainder of the mixture (the overall physically complex).

For Epicurus, "the psyche has to be a physique, because it is able to appearing and being acted upon, causal homes which belong basically to our bodies. " The psyche's good points are defined when it comes to "four awfully high-quality and cellular sorts of atom," e. g. , "the dominance of fire-like, wind-like or air-like atoms within the psychic makeup leads to animal or human features which are rather offended, fearful or placid. " there's an "exceptionally whole blend" of those 4 different types of atoms, which "helps to provide an explanation for the prevalence of complicated and refined features similar to the discrimination of characteristics fascinated about sensation. " He provides: "Producing this mixture of features is the precise function of the (unnamed) fourth form of psychic atoms, which turns out to were brought to supply an evidence on the atomic point for this awfully entire mix. " yet his in simple terms facts for this is often that the fourth kind is defined through Lucretius as "the 'psyche of the psyche'," and it kind of feels to me higher to assert easily that it was once brought to give an explanation for sensation, which not one of the different 3 can explain.

"The psyche as a whole," Gill subsequent notes, "seems to were subdivided into (in Latin) animus ('mind') and anima ('spirit'), characterised in a single (Greek) resource as 'rational' and 'non-rational' elements. " He emphasizes "that the mind-spirit complicated (which Lucretius describes as a 'single nature') is either physically in itself and heavily built-in with the remainder of the physique. " Epicurus' view of the site of the brain, says Gill, used to be "probably derived from previous money owed, similar to the heart-centered thought of Praxagoras. "

Next, Gill argues that "Epicureanism exhibits how a materialist thought of the psyche is appropriate with giving a coherent account of rational company and moral improvement. " He holds that "both Epicurus and Democritus undertake a reductionist view," breaking with Democritus simply in rejecting his eliminativism. "It is in line with this approach," he provides, "that we discover, in Epicurean money owed, the combo of atomic and mental motives of animal task, for example in Lucretius' account of the foundation of movement. " yet Lucretius' account (4. 881-90) doesn't point out atoms. Granted, it does point out the "images of walking" that needs to strike our minds prior to we stroll, and those pictures are certainly "structures of very small and wonderful atoms. " but when each clarification bringing up whatever that occurs to be made up of atoms counts as an 'atomic explanation,' then each Epicurean clarification will count number as one! As a moment instance of an account that "combines atomic and mental analysis," Gill bargains "Epicurus' description of human development" in On Nature 25. yet atoms merely determine into this account negatively, as no longer necessitating our improvement. "The description of human development," says Gill, "is couched in atomic phrases, for example within the account of our 'congenital nature' and likewise, via implication not less than, of the environmental affects or 'seeds' which 'flow in via our passages'. " yet, back, those aren't 'atomic explanations,' yet reasons by way of issues that ensue to be made from atoms, as every thing is.

Finally, Gill discusses issues of "linkage among physics and ethics," e. g. , the way in which that "the popularity of human mortality is taken to be an important for counteracting worry of demise. He notes, for example, that "the Epicurean definition of happiness . . . as excitement, characterizes this in phrases that mix actual and mental well-being," and that either kinetic and katastematic pleasures "include physically and mental dimensions. " I miss out on how those are linkages among physics and ethics, despite the fact that, until one counts any reference in one's ethics to the physique as a linkage to physics.

(8) Tim O'Keefe's "Action and responsibility" is a synopsis of his e-book Epicurus on Freedom (2005). In either he argues opposed to 'the conventional interpretation' of the function performed by way of the atomic swerve in holding our freedom. in this interpretation, as I defended it in "Epicurus on 'Free Volition' and the Swerve," Phronesis forty four (1999) 253-99, our volitions are brought on from the ground up via a number of swerves of our minds' constituent atoms. Lucretius explains that there are 3 varieties of macroscopic movement: movement because of collision, downward movement because of weight, and movement as a result of "free volition," while "we swerve our motions at no decided time nor in a decided position. " And "nothing can become from nothing"; all macroscopic motions needs to be prompted from the ground up through atomic motions. So our volitions has to be triggered from the ground up by means of indeterministic swerves of atoms.

My major feedback of O'Keefe's bankruptcy is that he fails to provide an explanation for away the looks that this can be what Lucretius potential to assert. in keeping with O'Keefe, the purpose of Lucretius' argument is to maintain, now not "the kind of 'two-way' strength both to do or to not do whatever that's meant through a few to be worthy at no cost will," yet only "effective agency," the "ability to do as one needs. " yet this fails to do justice to the emphasis in Lucretius' textual content on how indeterministic swerves underlie our indeterministic volitions.

It is correct that the "horses Lucretius describes on the beginning gates aren't attempting to come to a decision even if to damage from the gates. " they're offered as an alternative to demonstrate the way it takes time for his or her volitions to translate into activities. however, their motions are awarded as happening at an undetermined time and position. So, when you consider that not anything can come from not anything, they have to be triggered from the ground up via atomic swerves. it's also actual that Lucretius doesn't point out the swerve in DRN four. 877-96. yet that's simply because there he's not excited by explaining how our volitions should be unfastened yet in simple terms with how they have the capacity to set the nice bulk of the physique in movement. it's also precise that "a random atomic swerving in one's brain is an unpromising foundation for the creation of unfastened and liable activities. " yet from that we should always infer, no longer that Epicurus can't have held this type of view, yet that Epicurus did no greater than sleek libertarians after they try and specify the actual foundation of unfastened volition.

But it's a mistake, says O'Keefe, to imagine that Epicurus is a libertarian dealing with the sort of challenge. For Epicurus was once now not involved to maintain the "'two-sided unfastened will" of contemporary libertarians. He was once involved, says O'Keefe, merely to defeat the causal determinism that he (mistakenly) believed is entailed by means of logical determinism. because of this Epicurus denied the primary of bivalence as utilized to future-tensed propositions: he idea that, if all future-tensed propositions have a fact price at this time, there has to be explanations at the present that necessitate all destiny states of affairs. yet that will make deliberation unnecessary. For, after we planned, we presuppose the contingency of the longer term. That, in response to O'Keefe, is why Epicurus posited the swerve. yet was once now not one more reason that he desired to reconcile his atomism together with his libertarian instinct that it's surely open to us no matter if we do or now not do a given motion? O'Keefe could have us think that it's anachronistic to characteristic one of these problem to Epicurus. yet this looks what Aristotle is expressing whilst he says that, "when appearing is as much as us, so isn't really acting" (NE three. five, 1113b7-8). And it's a really simple intuition.

Lucretius says that the swerve preserves the "free volition" of "animals everywhere," not only of people. So why are we morally accountable brokers whilst different animals aren't? the reply, says O'Keefe, is that we have got cause and cause permits us to switch our wants, while animals have merely "irrational reminiscence. " I agree. I additionally agree that Epicurus was once a reductionist like Democritus; it's only Democritus' eliminativism that Epicurus rejected. Democritus claimed that such good traits as sweetness exist basically "by convention," inferring, from the truth that honey tastes candy to a couple and sour to others, that the honey is neither. Epicurus preserved the truth of such traits as sweetness, O'Keefe explains, via including the right kind relativizing skills, in order that 'honey is sweet' quantities to 'honey is good to these in such and such situations. ' The Epicureans took Democritus' eliminativism to incorporate, not just good features, but additionally compounds relatively more often than not, together with our personal our bodies and souls. Epicurus spoke back, argues Keefe, no longer by way of denying that compounds are reducible to their constituent atoms, yet by means of selecting compounds with their atoms and insisting that, notwithstanding the compounds aren't everlasting beings like their atoms, they're however real.

I believe this too. For, like O'Keefe, I reject David Sedley's analyzing of On Nature 25, based on which the brain has significantly emergent houses incompatible with reductionism. yet I disagree with O'Keefe's studying of this notoriously tough textual content. (For what I take to be the right kind studying, see pp. 290-94 of my aforementioned article. ) The bankruptcy ends with an effective dialogue of Epicurus' argument that the determinist is self-refuting.

(9) Raphael Woolf's "Pleasure and desire" starts through arguing that it's a mistake to determine Epicurus as an ascetic who swears off all luxurious. luxurious "is in reality to be welcomed," writes Woolf, "so lengthy as one has the proper attitude" towards it, "that it truly is to be loved if current, yet no longer ignored if absent. " the will for sumptuous nutrition, he notes, is a "natural" albeit "not necessary" hope; it turns into an empty wish provided that one thinks that one wishes it. I believe this. yet difficulties quickly floor. Woolf desires to say "that one's lifestyles is extra friendly yet now not happier" if one enjoys luxuries within the right means. yet in KD 18 Epicurus says that "pleasure doesn't raise as soon as the ache as a result of wish is removed" yet "is simply decorated (or varied)," which implies that the luxury lifestyles isn't really extra friendly. Woolf speaks of this as "the really drastic expedient of denying that excitement truly does behave in a different way than happiness," and contrasts it with "an substitute approach that Epicurus turns out to have labored with," that of distinguishing the katastematic pleasures (painlessness and undisturbedness) from kinetic pleasures and determining happiness with katastematic excitement, thereby permitting kinetic excitement to act in a different way from happiness, such that kinetic pleasures "might elevate the pleasantness of a existence . . . with out expanding its happiness. " On my view, against this, Epicurus has simply the single "drastic" technique of denying that both the pleasantness or the happiness of a lifestyles could be elevated as soon as one has katastematic pleasure.

Woolf subsequent asks why Epicurus counts the katastematic pleasures as pleasures and solutions that "the nation of freedom from soreness and misery . . . is skilled as having a good qualitative character," "a secure freshness . . . that feels magnificent. " yet, as I argued in "Epicurus at the Telos", Phronesis 38 (1993) 281-320, it is a mistake. Painlessness doesn't consider sturdy. it truly is reliable. certainly, it's the very best situation of the physique, a that can not be made larger via the addition of the friendly feeling introduced by way of a kinetic excitement, yet can basically be different. because of this Epicurus says that the katastematic pleasures produce the best pleasure to a rational agent. And, in view that pleasures are pointed out by means of Epicurus as items of pleasure, the katastematic pleasures are the best attainable pleasures. i don't deny that the location that I ascribe to Epicurus "seems a bit strained," because it quantities to denying that it really is extra friendly for a painless individual to be experiencing a sense of delight than to not be. yet Epicurus' place should still appear strained, i'd argue, for the way else to provide an explanation for Cicero's exasperated criticisms of it in De Finibus 2 with out supposing that Cicero has misunderstood it?

In a footnote to his declare that painlessness "feels wonderful," Woolf addresses my view. He concedes that there's "some proof that Epicurus looked the kingdom of being unfastened from ache and misery as an intentional object," that during which the best pleasure is taken. Then he says, "By itself this is able to supply Epicurus a slightly promiscuous (and correspondingly bland) hedonism, seeing that, as historic critics mentioned, you can celebrate in whatever. " precise adequate, I answer. within the bankruptcy that i'm writing for the Oxford instruction manual of Epicureanism, I shall handle this objection by way of defining Epicurean excitement normatively, as that during which a rational agent has strong cause to celebrate. Woolf additionally items that katastematic excitement should have a felt personality when you consider that "feeling" is the Epicurean functional criterion. To this I answer that soreness feels undesirable and psychological misery makes it very unlikely to take pleasure in what feels reliable, kinetic excitement, in its unadulterated country. Woolf additionally cites the so-called 'cradle argument', which starts off from the "supposition that what younger creatures locate appealing is the sensation of delight. " precise sufficient, I answer, however it doesn't persist with that katastematic excitement is a sense of delight. we commence off pursuing kinetic pleasures, yet turn out as rational Epicurean adults knowing that the foremost to dwelling a delightful existence is removal discomfort and worry. This friendly existence will contain kinetic pleasures, for the reason that you'll be able to no longer be freed from misery if one had no prospect of having fun with friendly emotions. yet katastematic excitement is the target, and never since it "feels significant. "

(10) Eric Brown's "Politics and society" starts via noting that, although Epicureans "discourage beginning a kin and fascinating in politics" and "deny that justice exists through nature," they aren't "apolitical. " quite, the Epicurean "adopts counter-cultural politics, rooted in his want for friendship and justice. " Brown ably defends Epicurus' conception of friendship opposed to a couple of criticisms, yet provides that one "sticks": that "Epicurus' egoistic hedonism can't maintain valuing others for his or her personal sake" and so Epicureans can't be actual neighbors. He notes that later "more timid" Epicureans caved in to this feedback and claimed that neighbors turn out valuing each other for his or her personal sakes. those later Epicureans, he rightly observes, "destroy Epicureanism's elegantly systematic insistence that one may still act regularly for the sake of enjoyment by myself. " He prefers the unique Epicurean view that "we should still search our friends' pleasures up to we search our personal, yet we should always search merely our personal pleasures for his or her personal sake. "

Brown starts his part on justice through noting, "Curiously, it isn't even transparent at the start that Epicurus' concept of justice permits him to claim neighborhood of sages will be simply. " For "there is not any justice and not using a conference that ideas out causing and discomfort harm" and "sages haven't any want for such legislation to manipulate themselves. " Then he argues that there are "two priceless and together enough stipulations defining simply and unjust actions": "An motion is unjust if and provided that it really is proscribed via a tradition made to prevent harming one another and being harmed and this conference truly advantages reciprocal group. " Even sages want this conference, he observes, simply because even they've got "need for co-ordinated behaviour to prevent damage and accomplish merits for mutual community": "The group of sages wishes justice even supposing sages desire neither legislation nor the phobia of punishment to motivate them to do as justice calls for. " He concludes via explaining "why there's not a extra concrete Epicurean 'political philosophy': what's only for one group is not only for one more, because what advantages reciprocal neighborhood is relative to the community's specific conditions. "

(11) Catherine Atherton's "Epicurean philosophy of language" starts off by means of noting that the Epicurean curiosity in language isn't the comparable as that of recent philosophers of language. So, for example, even though "Epicureans did settle for the lifestyles of a signifying relation among language and the area, our critical resources are not making it central," leaving it open to students to discuss even if Epicureans are intensionalists (the majority view) or extensionalists. Likewise, while one attempts to specify what Epicurus potential by way of "the 'empty (vocal) sounds' that are to be refrained from by way of right use of 'first thought-objects' in Ep. Hdt. 37," there's "a powerful temptation to think that those are accurately sounds that have experience yet fail to refer," yet Atherton warns us opposed to utilizing the trendy sense/reference contrast the following for the reason that it doesn't hire Epicurean suggestions. On her view, Epicurus is the following easily "warning us off speak about very unlikely mixtures of homes. " She emphasizes the inadequacies of Epicurus' conception. for instance, after providing Epicurus' naturalistic account of the starting place of language, she notes that, in "its reliance on a causal linkage, operating from exterior item through inner country to vocalization," it "removes keep watch over over vocalization from vocalizers," with the end result that utterances "will necessarily lack communicative (as against informational) content material. " additionally, in respond to the Epicurean argument opposed to "Plato's an expert or professional name-giver" that "he couldn't have had the anticipation . . . of the usefulness of names," Atherton asks, "if a putative name-giver couldn't build this anticipation with out acceptable event of names in use, whence did the genuine name-givers -- primitive people . . . -- get their anticipation thereof . . . ? " additionally, "the correct proof indicates a being concerned deficiency within the proper theoretical resources" to provide an explanation for ambiguity and a "general loss of curiosity in explaining the phenomenon of syntax. "

(12) David Blank's "Philosophia and technē: Epicureans at the arts" attracts on his paintings on Sextus Empiricus' opposed to the Professors of the Liberal stories and at the fragmentary texts of Philodemus bearing on rhetoric and different technai. clean starts with Epicurus' "opposition to paideia, the set of disciplines or matters of guide which instilled tradition and bestowed status at the Greek elite and contain the so-called 'liberal' arts, frequently: grammar or literature, rhetoric, dialectic, geometry, mathematics, astronomy, tune. " The Epicureans held that those arts "contributed not anything to the perfection of knowledge. " Philodemus offers that the Epicurean thinker "will have a non-technical knowledge" of assorted arts, like family administration, yet denies that professional mastery of any of them is necessary.

From Philodemus' On Wealth, clean takes this: "The thinker won't decide on the army or political lifetime of motion, the paintings of horsemanship, utilizing slaves to paintings mines, or cultivating the land along with his personal arms. " yet he may well "let others domesticate his farmland . . . or settle for hire from tenants and benefit from the services of his slaves. " easy methods to get source of revenue, even though, is to obtain presents from those that enjoy his philosophical discourses. subsequent clean turns to Philodemus' On song, which argues opposed to the view that tune is "important in moulding the nature of the younger and in enhancing behaviour via, for instance, soothing the angry" and argues for the view that "music distracts us from what's requisite. " subsequent clean notes that "the sage's perspective to writing poetry is seemingly just like his angle to appearing song: it's an excessive amount of hassle and distracts from philosophy to benefit and to preparation it, however it is ok to hear it with entertainment, as long as the ears will tolerate. " what's to be shunned is "learned conversations approximately 'musical difficulties and the philological questions of critics. '" subsequent clean turns to Sextus, whose critique of "grammar -- the services dedicated to the research of what's in poets and prose-writers" attracts on Epicureanism. This segues right into a dialogue of Philodemus' at the solid king based on Homer, in which "Philodemus issues out the precious precepts approximately monarchs in Homer's textual content. " Then he turns to Philodemus' On Poems, which "presents a critique of the poetic theories of different philosophers," arguing that they "overlooked the 'conceptions' . . . 'of solid and undesirable verse and poetry. '" eventually clean discusses Philodemus' On Rhetoric, which argues that "there is not any services of talking to assemblies and courtrooms," yet there's considered one of panegyric rhetoric (or "sophistic"), for "it has procedure, yet now not a lot of it. "

(13) James Warren's "Removing fear" starts by means of noting that, for the Epicureans, even supposing worry has a non-cognitive element, it really is "the results of lack of awareness and fake opinion. " So it's only "by use of our reasoning talents that we will come to shape the proper perspectives of the gods and loss of life and for that reason reach and revel in ataraxia. " subsequent Warren discusses a fascinating passage from Philodemus asserting that worry of the gods might be "addressed at once simply because humans are usually aware of what they suspect in regards to the subject," while worry of dying "is frequently pushed via a collection of unarticulated and neglected ideals. " Then he discusses every one of those fears in flip. i've got no feedback to make of his dialogue of the way the gods' blessedness exhibits that they're non-providential, of the way the argument from evil exhibits a similar factor, or of ways the Epicureans conceived of real piety. only one quibble: Warren cites me as a supporter of the 'idealist' view of the gods "as notion constructs. " yet in my aforementioned article "Epicurus at the Nature of the Gods" I reject either the idealist and the realist view of the gods in prefer of the view that the gods are "dual-natured. "

Warren's dialogue of the phobia of dying is even larger. He distinguishes "two comparable claims concerning the situation after an individual's loss of life. (1) After the dissolution of the soul there's no conception of enjoyment and discomfort. (2) After the dissolution of the soul there's no topic of damage; the person ceases to exist. " Then he examines glossy criticisms of Epicurus' view. at the 'comparative deprivation account,' individuals are harmed via dying simply because they don't adventure the products which they might have skilled had they died later. To this Warren replies that "it turns out ordinary to conceive of a 'loss' within which there is not any topic in any respect after the disappearance of the meant items. " He additionally notes the oddness of "the symmetrical claim" that individuals might be harmed by way of being born later than they may were, thereby lacking out on reports that they may have had. "The moment imperative feedback of the Epicurean view" mentioned via Warren is going like this: "It isn't in any respect incoherent to not worry 'being dead' yet, whereas alive, however to be troubled that one's lifestyles and its quite a few initiatives, hopes and needs, will necessarily come to an end" and "more particularly that it can come to an finish too quickly. " The Epicureans answer that, "once the nice lifestyles has been accomplished, there isn't any feel during which it may be minimize brief upfront because it is already whole. " This, says Warren, "is a thorough and revisionist account of what constitutes a 'complete life'" and it leaves one thinking about "if the cost for a existence with out worry of loss of life in any experience is far too excessive: it's a existence we can't think desirous to reach or to proceed residing. "

(14) Voula Tsouna's "Epicurean healing strategies" starts off with the Epicureans' perception of themselves, at the "medical analogy," as medical professionals purging sufferers of ailments of the soul. Then she turns to a dialogue of a few of the healing innovations that Epicureans hire. She discusses Philodemus' On Frank Speech, and is the reason "the candid feedback that an Epicurean instructor addresses to a student," feedback that's adapted to the person scholar. Then she explains that, although a "large a part of Epicurus' perception of remedy . . . is composed in arguments," one must never forget the extra-cognitive features of treatment, comparable to "repetition and memorization. " subsequent she discusses healing options that she unearths in Lucretius, just like the repeated use of the 1st individual plural which calls for the reader's lively participation. right here her thought of a healing procedure indicates itself to be relatively extensive certainly. If even using loads of photos and metaphors counts as a healing procedure, then what does not?

She is going directly to provide different examples of Epicurean healing ideas: urging us "to domesticate an neutral perspective," "redescribing ordinary issues in an unexpected light," getting scholars to take the lengthy view in their lives as a manner of fighting passions, getting scholars "to get to understand their very own selves," moving recognition, and "moral portraiture," composing sketches of characters who're ethical paradigms, sturdy or undesirable. She concludes by means of protecting Epicurean remedy, insisting that it's not brainwashing, yet a method that contains the coed in "self-examination and self-criticism. "

(15) Catherine Wilson's "Epicureanism in early glossy philosophy" brings the amount to a becoming shut. She starts by way of explaining how the restoration of Epicurean texts within the early glossy interval "contributed to the formation of a rival photo of nature -- the corpuscularian, mechanical philosophy -- that changed the scholastic synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christian doctrine. " Epicureanism, she explains, used to be looked via many as a morally corrupting strength, yet came upon desire between scientists and motivated, not just Gassendi, but additionally Bacon, Boyle, Locke, Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes. there has been a sticking element, despite the fact that: Epicurean mortalism, which "threatened the root of the Christian faith. " This is helping clarify how Descartes' dualism arose, why Leibniz "saw the need of making a whole rival procedure of immaterial atomism or 'monadology,'" or even Kant's two-world view.

"The vindication of enjoyment used to be as major a function of early glossy ethical philosophy as its reputation of corpuscularism," she is going directly to say, earlier than tracing its effect from Lorenzo Valla to David Hume. Then she describes the impact of Epicurus' notion of justice, aptly mentioning Thomas Creech's comment that "the admirers of Mr. Hobbes might simply parent that his Politics are yet Lucretius enlarged" and emphasizing that "the improvement of the Utilitarian view that the functionality of the country is to make males chuffed . . . is unthinkable within the absence of renewed awareness to Epicurean ethical and political conception. " Then she describes the serious response to the revival of atomism, noting the arguments made opposed to atoms combining through blind likelihood to create our global and opposed to atomism explaining our souls. She concludes through emphasizing what number "characteristically sleek doctrines . . . have historic roots in Epicureanism. "

This final bankruptcy, like lots of the others, is notable for the way a lot is expounded so in actual fact in so brief an area. (The ordinary size of a bankruptcy is 17-18 pages. ) i've got expressed reservations a couple of variety of the chapters, yet no average reviewer could be serious of the paintings total. James Warren merits commendation for enhancing this welcome boost to Epicurean studies.
The publication ends with a 23-page bibliography, a 26-page index locorum, and a 7-page common index.

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This fundamental quantity provides for the 1st time a complete anthology of crucial of Martin Heidegger's lately chanced on early essays. Translated via preeminent Heidegger students, those supplementations to Heidegger's released corpus are drawn from his lengthy sequence of early experimental, continually supplemental makes an attempt at rethinking philosophy. Written in the course of 1910–1925, they precede Being and Time and element past to Heidegger's later writings, while his recognized “turn” took, partly, the shape of a “return” to his earliest writings.

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Extra resources for Citations philosophiques expliquées : 100 citations pour découvrir l'histoire de la philosophie et se familiariser avec les différents thèmes

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G. GA18, GA22, GA24) and thereafter. e. only in relation to the finite and infinite in mathematics. But number itself, as unmoving, is outside time 54 Michael Eldred: The Digital Cast of Being xro/noj me/tron kinh/sewj, 221a1). The now (to\ nu=n) divides the earlier from the later like a point (stigmh/, 219b18) divides a line (grammh/) into two parts (220a21). The succession of nows counted off as ‘now’, and ‘now’, and ‘now’ is the progress of time coming to presence and simultaneously disappearing from presence.

G 1;200b19) phenomenon which means that it is connected (e)xo/menon) and also that it holds itself together within itself (sune/xein). e. for which there is no discrete limit where the division has to stop. The indefinite, double or twofold determination of movement as both du/namij and e)ntele/xeia at once would seem to have to do with its continuous, limitlessly divisible nature. The presence of the du/namij cannot be separated from the likewise present absence or lack of the e)ntele/xeia as the perfect, finished present toward which the du/namij in its e)ne/rgeia is stretched.

The rational numbers have to be complemented by the irrational numbers to attain the entirety of a continuous line with all the possible magnitudes it contains. e. a magnitude that cannot be expressed as a fraction of two integers. How are the countable, rational numbers to be completed to get the real numbers? Real number is an appropriate term because only by means of these real numbers can all the magnitudes of sensually perceptible, real, physical bodies be assigned a number. The task is how physical res can be captured mathematically by number, and not merely by geometry.

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